



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AND REGIONAL POLICY



Connecticut Police Pursuit Report 2025



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AUTHORS

Dr. Lydia Wileden, Ph.D.

Assistant Research Professor
Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy
School of Public Policy
University of Connecticut

Ken Barone

Associate Director
Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy
School of Public Policy
University of Connecticut

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Executive Summary

In 2019, Connecticut enacted Public Act 19-90, which reformed police pursuit policies and mandated standardized pursuit reporting. As required by that public act, the Police Officer Standards and Training Council (POSTC) subsequently adopted a statewide pursuit policy emphasizing risk assessment, supervisory oversight, and the importance of terminating pursuits when risks outweigh public safety benefits.

A further requirement of Public Act 19-90 is the annual reporting of police pursuit activity in Connecticut. To that end, this report, undertaken on behalf of POSTC by the Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy (IMRP) at the University of Connecticut, examines police pursuit activity in Connecticut in 2025. The report analyzes data from 435 pursuit-tracking reports submitted by 68 police departments reflecting pursuit activity in the 2025 calendar year. It also highlights limitations of the existing standardized Pursuit Tracking Form and reporting process and makes recommendations for improved data collection. The analysis is descriptive and does not seek to establish a causal relationship between pursuit tactics and outcomes. It also does not evaluate event or department-level compliance with existing pursuit policy.

The analysis supports the Police Officer Standards and Training Council in its efforts to improve transparency, accountability, and policy compliance related to police vehicle pursuits.

Key Findings

E.1: Pursuit Activity and Outcomes

- 1. Frequency and Distribution of Pursuits:** In 2025, Connecticut recorded 435 pursuit reports¹, representing an estimated 396 unique pursuit events after accounting for duplicate reporting. On average, there were approximately 33 pursuit events per month. Most pursuits (68%) involved a single police vehicle, while about one-third involved multiple units.

Sixty-eight police departments submitted at least one pursuit report while thirty municipal departments did not submit any pursuit reports for the 2025 calendar year. Reported pursuit activity was concentrated among a relatively small number of departments. Nine departments submitted 10 or more pursuit reports, accounting for 60% of all submitted reports. However, the data show that differences in departmental interpretations of pursuit policy and reporting practices make it difficult to meaningfully examine department-level variation in pursuit involvement.

- 2. Reasons for Pursuit Initiation:** Motor vehicle violations were the most common reason for pursuit, cited in 59% of reports. These include offenses such as speeding, reckless driving, and failure to stop. Suspected criminal offenses were noted in 41% of cases, though only 14% of reports explicitly state the pursuit was in response to a suspected violent offense. It is important to note that Connecticut's pursuit policy generally restricts pursuits primarily to violent crimes or exigent circumstances.

¹ The IMRP analyzed all reports submitted by March 18, 2026. 10 reports were submitted after this date and excluded from the analysis.

3. **Pursuit Termination and Outcomes:** Approximately 80% of pursuits were terminated—called off by the officer or a supervisor—rather than being engaged to conclusion. This high rate of termination suggests adherence to the statewide pursuit policy, which emphasizes disengagement when risks outweigh benefits. Most terminations were initiated by officers, with supervisors also playing a significant role. Twenty percent of pursuits were continued to conclusion.
4. **Collisions, Injuries, and Damage:** Sixteen percent of pursuit events resulted in a collision, 7% resulted in reported injuries, and 18% involved property damage.

Statistical models examining differences in outcomes dependent on whether pursuits were terminated or continued to conclusion found that pursuits that continued to conclusion were significantly more likely to result in harm. Concluded pursuits were approximately six times more likely to result in collisions, injuries, or damage compared to those that were terminated.

5. **Policy Compliance and Oversight:** Supervisory review of pursuit reports was nearly universal, with 98% of reports reviewed. Most pursuits (85%) were determined to be within policy, 10% were found to be outside policy, and the remaining pursuit reports did not contain a policy determination. Pursuits involving injuries were significantly more likely to be deemed out of policy.

E.2: Reporting Gaps and Data Limitations

1. **Inconsistent Definitions and Reporting Practices:** There is substantial variation across departments in how pursuits are defined and reported. Some agencies document brief, low-speed, or non-escalated incidents as pursuits, while others may only report more sustained events. This inconsistency limits comparability across jurisdictions.
2. **Potential Underreporting of Pursuits:** Police departments differed in their interpretation of reporting requirements. Though statute [14-283a(f)(2)] requires “each police officer who engages in a pursuit to report such pursuit on the standardized form”, that language does not directly align with the POSTC model policy. As a result, some departments interpret the POSTC policy as requiring only one report per pursuit event regardless of the number of officers involved. Due to this discrepancy, it is estimated that as many as 186 additional reports anticipated based on the number of police vehicles involved in pursuit were not submitted.
3. **Reliance on Open-Ended Fields:** The current standard pursuit reporting form relies heavily on open-ended text fields, resulting in hundreds of unique responses for key variables such as reasons for pursuit and termination. This lack of standardization makes systematic analysis difficult and introduces subjectivity into the data.
4. **Missing and Incomplete Data:** Significant portions of the dataset are incomplete. Location data, particularly where pursuits are terminated or concluded, is often missing, vague, or inconsistently reported (e.g., only listing a town or a general roadway). These limitations make it difficult to assess key factors such as pursuit distance, geographic patterns, and whether pursuits in Connecticut align with national findings that most are short in duration. Together, these gaps constrain the ability to fully evaluate the risks and characteristics of pursuit activity.

5. **Lack of Event-Level Identifiers:** The absence of a unique identifier for each pursuit event makes it difficult to link multiple reports to a single incident. As a result, researchers must rely on manual comparisons of variables such as date, time, and location to deduplicate records, increasing the potential for error.
6. **Data Entry and Format Issues:** Data are currently submitted via PDF forms and manually entered into a database, creating opportunities for transcription errors. Additional inconsistencies, such as mixed time formats and handwritten entries, further reduce data reliability.

This report provides an important baseline understanding of police pursuit activity in Connecticut. While reforms enacted in 2019 have improved reporting and introduced stricter policy standards, challenges remain in both practice and data quality.

Based on the analysis below, the following actions are recommended:

- Revise the standardized Pursuit Tracking Form to more consistently capture data and to integrate into existing police records management systems.
- Standardize statutory definitions of pursuit to improve consistency and comparability.
- Review statewide policy to limit discrepancies between statutory language in CT Gen Stat § 14-283a and the POSTC statewide pursuit policy.
- Strengthen reporting compliance to ensure accurate and complete statewide data while limiting administrative burden on departments.
- Improve alignment between practice and policy, particularly regarding pursuits for non-violent offenses.

Improving data systems and refining reporting practices will be essential for future analyses and for supporting evidence-based policy decisions. Continued monitoring and evaluation will help ensure that pursuit policies effectively balance public safety, officer accountability, and the need for law enforcement intervention.

Background

Police pursuit—an attempt by a police officer in an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend any occupant of another moving motor vehicle, when the driver of the fleeing motor vehicle is attempting to avoid apprehension by maintaining or increasing the speed of such vehicle or by ignoring the police officer's attempt to stop such vehicle²—has been called by researchers the most prevalent use-of-force policing tactic.³ Whereas other use-of-force tactics—including police shootings, taser use, and physical restraint methods—have been highly scrutinized in recent years⁴, pursuits have generally garnered less attention or public discussion.⁵ While police officers have long pursued suspects as a law enforcement tactic, recent reforms have sought to curb the practice in all but the most essential situations.

Debate around the use of vehicle pursuit as a policing strategy focuses on the efficacy and potential harms of pursuits. Compared to other police activities like traffic stops, police pursuits are rare as a proportion of total police engagements. Contrary to their portrayal in popular media, most pursuits are short in distance and duration—lasting approximately 1–5 minutes—and occur primarily at low speeds.⁶ Additionally, some research suggests that pursuits prove productive in terms of arrests. One synthesizing study from 2000 estimated that pursuits ended in arrest 68–82% of the time, leading pursuit advocates to conclude that the benefits of pursuits outweigh their costs.⁷ Moreover, police leaders point to the role pursuits play in enhancing public safety by dealing directly and swiftly with motorists whose actions endanger the public.

However, legal scholars and safety advocates since the 1960s have argued that pursuits are inherently risky, creating potential for harm to the public, opening police departments to legal liability, and resulting in loss of property or even loss of life.⁸ A scan of existing research on pursuits suggests that 18–44% of pursuits end with a motor vehicle crash, 5–24% culminate in injury, and 1–3% result in crash-related

² State of Connecticut. 2019. Public Act No. 19-90. *An Act Concerning the Use of Force and Pursuits by Police and Increasing Police Accountability and Transparency*. Section 5(a).

³ Alpert, Geoffrey P., and Patrick R. Anderson. 1986. “The Most Deadly Force: Police Pursuits.” *Justice Quarterly* 3(1):1–14.

⁴ Kalinowski, Jesse J., Kenneth Barone, and Renee LaMark Muir. 2025. *State of Connecticut Report on Police Use of Force, July 2022–December 2023*. University of Connecticut: Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy. <https://imrp-dpp.media.uconn.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3351/2025/08/2022-2023-CT-Police-Use-of-Force-Report-Final.pdf>.

⁵ Kalinowski, Jesse J., Kenneth Barone, and Renee LaMark Muir. 2025. *State of Connecticut Report on Police Use of Force, July 2022–December 2023*. University of Connecticut: Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy. <https://imrp-dpp.media.uconn.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3351/2025/08/2022-2023-CT-Police-Use-of-Force-Report-Final.pdf>.

⁶ Alpert, Geoffrey P., and Roger G. Dunham. 1988. “Research on Police Pursuits: Applications for Law Enforcement.” *American Journal of Police* 7(2):123–32

⁷ Alpert, Geoffrey P., Dennis Jay Kenney, Roger G. Dunham, and William C. Smith. 2000. *Police Pursuits: What We Know*. Washington, D.C: Police Executive Research Forum; Crew, Robert E., and Robert A. Hart. 1999. “Assessing the Value of Police Pursuit.” *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* 22(1):58–74. doi: [10.1108/13639519910256884](https://doi.org/10.1108/13639519910256884).

⁸ Alpert, Geoffrey P., and William C. Smith. 2008. “Police Pursuits After Scott v Harris: Far from Ideal?” *Ideas in American Policing* (10).; Alpert and Dunham. 1988.; Hutson, H. Range, Phillip L. Rice Jr., Jasroop K. Chana, Demetrios N. Kyriacou, Yuchiao Chang, and Robert M. Miller. 2007. “A Review of Police Pursuit Fatalities in the United States From 1982–2004.” *Prehospital Emergency Care* 11(3):278–83. doi: [10.1080/10903120701385414](https://doi.org/10.1080/10903120701385414).

fatalities.⁹ A 2007 study using data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) found that police pursuits were associated with 0.7% of all fatal motorist crashes.¹⁰ Many pursuit victims are not directly involved in pursuits. Estimates suggest that roughly 25% of pursuit fatalities are bystanders or otherwise uninvolved motorists.¹¹ Many fatalities (59%) resulted from collisions with static property, suggesting a costly but unquantified amount of property damage in addition to the loss of human life.¹² Moreover, research finds that most pursuits (54–63%) are initiated in response to minor traffic or misdemeanor offenses, raising concerns about proportionality and unnecessary escalation.¹³

These findings, however, should be taken with a grain of salt, as available research on the outcomes of police pursuits is limited and often outdated. Evidence on the nature and effects of police pursuits is thin and variable, in part due to limited or low-quality data. Few states require officers to report pursuit activity, meaning that the positive and negative effects of pursuits may be misstated due to a large amount of missing data. Recognizing this, some states have worked to reform their pursuit policies with the express intention of reducing the frequency of pursuits while improving the quality of their pursuit data. Connecticut is one of those states.

This report aims to counteract that dearth of evidence. It is the first police pursuit report written by the Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy (IMRP) at the University of Connecticut. This report was undertaken in compliance with CT Gen Stat § 14-283a, which requires the Police Officer Standards and Training Council (POSTC)—in partnership with an institution of higher education or a similar research entity—to annually compile, analyze, and summarize police pursuit reports and submit the findings and legislative recommendations to the Connecticut General Assembly’s joint standing committee on Public Safety and Security. At the request of POSTC, IMRP collected and processed reports related to pursuit activity in the 2025 calendar year. The resulting report aims to enhance transparency and accountability in policing while also advising on opportunities to improve pursuit data collection and revise pursuit policy.

⁹ Hutson et al 2007; Alpert et al 2000.

¹⁰ Hutson et al 2007.

¹¹ Neilson, Susie, Jennifer Gollan, and Janie Haseman. 2024. “Police Chases Kill Hundreds Every Year — Most Victims Aren’t the Drivers Being Pursued.” CT Insider, March 1; Hutson et al 2007.

¹² Hutson et al 2007.

¹³ Hutson et al 2007.

I. Connecticut's Pursuit Policy

In 2019, Connecticut lawmakers passed, and Governor Lamont signed Public Act 19-90: *An Act Concerning the Use of Force and Pursuits by Police and Increasing Police Accountability and Transparency*. That legislation updated Connecticut General Statute 14-283a, required police departments to record all instances of police pursuit using a standardized form, and requested the development of an updated “uniform, state-wide policy for handling pursuits by police officers.” That policy was mandated to detail when police chases are appropriate, coordination and responsibility for the pursuit, and training related to pursuit tactics.¹⁴

That same year, the Police Officer Standards and Training Council (POSTC) issued General Notice 19-04, adopting new standards regarding police pursuits.¹⁵ The goal of this updated guidance was to revise the Uniform Statewide Pursuit Policy as a minimum standard guiding vehicle pursuit, with the explicit recognition that “pursuits of fleeing motor vehicles may present a danger to the lives of the public, officers, and those vehicle occupants involved in the pursuit.”¹⁶ (See Appendix A for POSTC General Notice 19-04 and 21-10).

Whereas past guidance stated that pursuit was justified “when the necessity of apprehension outweighs the danger of pursuit” or when an officer feels an offender “clearly exhibits an intent to avoid arrest,”¹⁷ the new standard modified the conditions under which initiation of a pursuit is justified. Specifically, POSTC General Notice 21-10 states that **police may only engage in a pursuit if “the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver or occupant has committed or is attempting to commit a crime of violence, or there are exigent circumstances that warrant the need to apprehend the suspect in a timely manner.”** The policy makes it explicit that motor vehicle offenses, property crimes, and nonviolent crimes are not appropriate grounds for pursuit, barring extraordinary circumstances. It also emphasizes the importance of considering context before engaging in pursuit, including:

- If the identity of the suspect is known and apprehension is possible by other means;
- If the danger to the public and the officer created by the pursuit is less than the danger if the suspect remains at large;
- The speed, direction, and density of other vehicles and pedestrian traffic;
- Environmental factors (weather, time of the day, visibility, road conditions);
- Location and population density.

The policy goes on to outline acceptable operations and tactics related to pursuits, including the use of appropriate warning equipment; the necessity of establishing and maintaining communication with dispatch regarding the location, direction, speed, and purpose of the pursuit; the position and number of permissible police vehicles involved in pursuit; and the use of intervention techniques like boxing in, use of stop sticks, etc. Within the policy, there is explicit guidance emphasizing the role of supervisor oversight in determining the appropriateness of continuing or terminating pursuit, and the need for constant

¹⁴ State of Connecticut. Public Act No. 19-90. *An Act Concerning the Use of Force and Pursuits by Police and Increasing Police Accountability and Transparency*.

¹⁵ Boisvert, Karen. 2019. General Notice 19-04. *Council Action—Adoption of the Updated Model Pursuit Policy*.

¹⁶ Boisvert 2019.

¹⁷ Rose, Veronica, and Jim Fazzalaro. 1993. *High Speed Car Chases by Police Officers*. 94-R-0037. Office of Legislative Research: The Connecticut General Assembly.

reevaluation of continued pursuit and intervention tactics. Section 9 of the model policy states that officers engaged in the pursuit and their supervisor shall continually re-evaluate and assess the pursuit situation, including the initiating factors, and terminate the pursuit if risks associated with continued pursuit are greater than the public safety benefit of making an immediate apprehension. Terminations are also suggested if later apprehension is feasible, if communication between pursuing officers and dispatch or command falters, or if the fleeing motor vehicle is believed to be operated by a juvenile in relation to a non-violent crime.

To establish greater consistency and standardization around reporting, the POSTC policy requires that any police officer engaged in a pursuit “shall file a written report on the appropriate form... describing the circumstances.” This report must then be reviewed by the appropriate supervisor to determine policy compliance and identify training deficiencies. Each department is then responsible for reporting their involvement in a police pursuit to POSTC on the standardized reporting form. These forms are submitted by email and later analyzed to produce an annual report on pursuit activity in Connecticut, in accordance with section 14-283a of the Connecticut General Statutes. This report leverages this required data collection to examine the nature of police pursuit and the extent to which pursuit activity reflects the principles and practices emphasized in the model policy. It covers pursuit-tracking reports related to pursuit activity for the 2025 calendar year.

II. Data Collection and Processing

As described above, Connecticut police departments that engage in vehicle pursuits must submit a standardized Pursuit Tracking Form to a state email address after each pursuit event. The current version of the State of Connecticut Pursuit Tracking Form was implemented in 2019 and revised in 2021 (see Appendix B). Forms are submitted electronically as PDF documents. Beginning in 2025, the Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy assumed responsibility for managing the pursuit reporting on behalf of the POSTC and for collecting and processing submitted pursuit reports.

To create an analyzable dataset, IMRP staff manually entered information from each submitted PDF into a structured Excel database that mirrors the fields on the standardized tracking form. To minimize transcription errors, each report underwent a two-step quality assurance process: data were entered by one staff member and later reviewed for completeness and accuracy under the supervision of senior research staff. Although these procedures reduce the likelihood of error, some inaccuracies may remain due to illegible handwriting, ambiguous responses, or the challenges of consistently transcribing information from open-ended fields. Additional data quality considerations are discussed in Section IV.

Prior to analysis, IMRP researchers conducted extensive data cleaning and preprocessing to improve data consistency and reliability. This process included correcting inconsistencies where possible, standardizing categorical responses, creating indicator variables, and reviewing missing or incomplete data. Because several fields on the tracking form allow open-text responses, qualitative coding was required to create standardized categories for analysis. Two researchers independently reviewed and coded responses to the "Reason for pursuit" and "Reason for pursuit termination" fields. The researchers then compared coding decisions, resolved discrepancies through discussion, and reached consensus on the final coding scheme.

Because multiple officers—and, in some cases, multiple agencies—may submit reports for the same pursuit event, the research team developed two analytic datasets. The first is a report-level dataset, which includes every pursuit report submitted to POSTC. The second is an event-level dataset that removes duplicate reports for the same pursuit event. The event-level dataset enables analyses of pursuit characteristics without inflating estimates from multiple reports describing a single incident, while the report-level dataset preserves the full range of reported information, including instances in which officers documented different observations or outcomes for the same pursuit.

In the absence of a unique pursuit event identifier, duplicate reports were identified through manual review. Researchers compared reports using variables such as pursuit date and time, reporting agency, reason for pursuit, pursuit outcomes, and the number of police vehicles involved to determine, as best as possible, whether the reports described the same event. When duplicate reports were identified, the report submitted by the primary pursuing unit, when available, was retained in the event-level dataset.

Statistical Analysis

The resulting datasets were used to produce descriptive statistics summarizing pursuit activity across Connecticut, including reporting volume by department, pursuit characteristics, reasons for initiating and terminating pursuits, offender characteristics, and agency review practices. Where appropriate, inferential statistical analyses, including independent-samples *t*-tests and bivariate logistic regression models, were conducted to examine differences between groups and identify factors associated with key outcomes.


Statistical significance is reported using p -values, with values less than 0.05 considered statistically significant. A statistically significant finding indicates that the observed difference or association is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. Results from logistic regression models are presented as odds ratios, which quantify the relative odds of an outcome occurring for one group compared with a reference group.

III. Summary of Data Findings

III.A. Number of Pursuit Reports & Number of Pursuit Events

As required by state statute [14-283a(f)(4)], IMRP analyzed police pursuit reports submitted for the 2025 calendar year. In total, 435 reports of police pursuits in 2025 were received between January 2, 2025, and March 18, 2026.¹⁸ This number reflects a slight decrease in the number of submitted reports from the previous year and a 118-report decrease (-21%) from 2022, the year with the greatest number of submitted pursuit reports since reporting requirements changed in 2021. Figure 3.1 shows the number of reported police pursuits by year.

Figure 3. 1: Police Pursuit Reports Submitted by Year



This trend in police pursuit reports should not be interpreted as the trend in annual police pursuit events (i.e., the total number of pursuits engaged in in a year). In some cases, departments submitted multiple reports for a single pursuit event to reflect the involvement of multiple police vehicles. In other cases, multiple police agencies engaged in the pursuit and submitted reports related to the same event, reflecting instances when a pursuit crossed jurisdictional lines or when backup was requested from proximate officers. As a result, more pursuit reports were received than the number of documented pursuit events. Determining the number of discrete pursuit events from the reports is complicated. There is no field within the standard Pursuit Tracking Form to identify when multiple reports are part of a single event. Only by

¹⁸ 438 reports were received, but close examination of the data identified three reports from Enfield as exact duplicates and thus they were removed from analysis. As of May 12, 2026, an additional 10 pursuit reports were submitted for 2025. These reports were not included in this analysis.

comparing other details of the pursuit—date, time, department, reason, number of police vehicles involved, etc.—can one estimate the number of annual pursuit events.

One indicator that multiple reports relate to a single pursuit event is data on the vehicle operator’s pursuit position. The top of the standardized pursuit form includes check boxes to identify “Primary” and/or “Secondary.” The POSTC pursuit policy offers definitions for and makes frequent reference to “Primary unit”—the police vehicle that initiated and/or assumed control of the pursuit—and “Secondary unit—any police vehicle involved as a backup to the primary unit for part or all of a pursuit. However, it should be noted that the form itself does not specify whether this field is meant to capture unit—meaning a police vehicle—or agency—meaning a police department. The policy’s reporting requirement (Sec. 11) states “Departments shall indicate on the form whether they were the initiating *agency* or a secondary *unit* (emphasis added).” Because of this, there is some disagreement about the interpretation of this field. Nonetheless, it is a valuable indicator of when multiple reports may relate to a single pursuit event.

Within the 435 reports, the majority (83%) were submitted by a primary operator, while 8% of reports were submitted by secondary or support operators. Two reports (.5%) were submitted indicating that the vehicle served as both a primary and a secondary operator during a pursuit. An additional 35 reports (8%) did not include an indication of pursuit position, nearly half of which were submitted using an alternative pursuit form. It should be noted that not all reports submitted by a secondary operator can be matched to a report by a primary operator. Of the 36 reports indicating that they were submitted by secondary operators, 8 do not obviously correspond to a report submitted by a primary pursuit operator. Another indicator that multiple reports may relate to a single pursuit event is data on the number of vehicles involved. In pursuit reports from 2025, the number of police vehicles involved ranges from 1 to 8¹⁹ with an average of 1.5 vehicles per pursuit. The majority (68%) of reported pursuits involved a single police vehicle, while a third (32%) involved two or more police vehicles. One finding that emerged from the analysis of multi-vehicle pursuits is that the number of pursuit reports submitted was lower than expected if a report were submitted for every officer or police vehicle involved in a pursuit. Whether multiple reports are required when pursuits involve multiple operators is a source of disagreement among police departments. Though state statute [14-283a(f)(2)] requires “each police officer who engages in a pursuit to report such pursuit on the standardized form”, the POSTC Police Motor Vehicle Pursuit Policy (2021) states, “Whenever a police officer engages in a pursuit, the police officer shall file a written report on the *appropriate form* required by his or her agency describing the circumstances (emphasis added).” The different references to “the standardized form” and “the appropriate form” appear to have led police departments to interpret reporting requirements differently, with some departments interpreting the POSTC policy as requiring only one report per pursuit event, regardless of the number of officers involved.

Reporting practices appear to vary across agencies. Some agencies submit a separate pursuit report for each police vehicle involved, while others appear to submit a single report for the entire incident. If reporting is intended at the officer- or vehicle-level, a comparison of the number of reports received with the number anticipated based on the police vehicles involved suggests that at least 171 pursuit reports

¹⁹ In some cases, the number of reported vehicles involved is less than the number of reports received related to a pursuit event. For example, a pursuit on October 15th, 2025, referenced 6 involved police vehicles but 9 reports were submitted. This may suggest some administrative error. It is also worth noting that pursuit policy states that “Unless circumstances dictate otherwise, a pursuit shall consist of no more than three police vehicles.”

may be missing.²⁰ Specifically, if a report had been submitted for every police vehicle operator involved in pursuits recorded in 2025, approximately 606 pursuit reports would have been expected.²¹ 12 submitting agencies interpreted the reporting requirement—at least some of the time—as requiring a report from more than just the primary operator.

Acknowledging that no pursuit event case identifier exists, that not all reports were submitted by primary operators, and that in some cases only a secondary operator reported the pursuit, it is still possible to deduplicate the data and estimate the number of pursuit events in 2025. A close examination of the corpus of 2025 pursuit reports suggests that 60 of the 435 reports reflect the same 21 pursuit events involving multiple police vehicles. For example, nine reports completed by different participating vehicle operators all refer to a single multi-car pursuit event in East Haven on October 15th, 2025. If only one report per pursuit event is retained, the data captures 396 separate police pursuit events in Connecticut in 2025.²²

Figure 3. 2: Pursuit Events by Month, 2025




Figure 3.2 captures reported pursuit events by month for the 2025 calendar year. Based on this single year of data, pursuits appear to be spread relatively evenly throughout the year. In the average month in 2025, there were 33 pursuit events. If the 396 pursuit events were evenly distributed across all 12 months, we would expect to observe 33 events per month (8.3% of pursuits). While we observe some variation in

²⁰ Where discrepancies between the number of vehicles involved and number of reports were unclear, researchers opted for a conservative interpretation and assumed no discrepancy. Thus, this figure may be an undercount of these reports.


²¹ One interpretation of this discrepancy between the number of submitted reports and the number of police vehicles is that the policy requiring a report for every involved vehicle may represent an administrative burden and redundancy. Indeed, the data captured in multiple reports does not necessarily introduce additional information for a pursuit event, though in some cases reports from the same event disagree about the reason for, termination of, or outcome of a pursuit.

²² Pursuit events not reported cannot be accounted for in this data.

monthly pursuits, with more reported pursuit events in January and September, and fewer in May, November, and December, these deviations do not suggest a pattern in pursuit activity across seasons.²³

Similarly, pursuits appear to occur throughout the day. While a third (31%) of pursuits were reported in the early morning—between 12 AM and 5:59 AM— only slightly fewer occurred at other hours, as captured in Figure 3.3. It should be noted that 7% of pursuit events did not indicate a time. Additionally, inconsistencies in the reporting of pursuit time—with some officers using military time (24 hours) while others using standard time (12 hours)—mean that this data may contain inaccuracies. For example, two reports submitted for June 10th, 2025, pursuit engaged in by two departments differ in how they report the time, with one department reporting the event as occurring at 21:08 and the other reporting it at 9:08. Standardizing reporting methods to eliminate these minor discrepancies can improve data quality and make it easier to spot reporting overlaps.

Figure 3. 3: Pursuit Events by Time of Day, 2025



III.B. Departments and Officers Participating in Pursuits

In 2025, 68 police departments submitted pursuit reports. This includes pursuit reports from 64 municipal police departments, the Connecticut State Police, and three special police districts²⁴. Thirty municipal departments did not submit any pursuit reports for the 2025 calendar year.²⁵ Fifty departments submitted 5 or fewer pursuit reports, with 18 submitting only 1 report.

²³ Chi-square tests of monthly counts and negative binomial regression models suggest that pursuit events are evenly distributed across months and do not deviate significantly from the mean ($p > .05$).

²⁴ The special police agencies include the CT Environmental Police, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and the University of Connecticut.

²⁵ Departments that did not report any pursuits in 2025 by March 18th, 2026, include: Ansonia, Bethel, Canton, Coventry, Danbury, East Windsor, Easton, Fairfield, Granby, Groton City, Hamden, Meriden, Middlebury, Newington, Norwich, Orange, Plainville, Plymouth, Portland, Redding, Ridgefield, South Windsor, Stonington, Thomaston, West

Nine departments submitted 10 or more pursuit reports, accounting for 60% of all submitted reports. Table 3.1 lists the five departments that submitted the most pursuit reports in 2025. The State Police, which has jurisdiction over state highways as well as in all or part of 78 municipalities that either lack their own organized police department or have agreed, under contract, to let the State Police supervise their police officers or constables²⁶—submitted 51 reports (12%). A quarter (25%) of all reports of police pursuits came from the Enfield Police Department. While this might give the appearance that Enfield police engaged disproportionately in police pursuits, it instead appears that Enfield adheres to a different department protocol regarding when police engagement qualifies as a pursuit and requires reporting. This is explained in more detail below.

Table 3. 1: Submitted Pursuit Reports by Police Department (Top 5)

Police Department	Number of Pursuit Reports	% of Total Reports
Enfield	109	25%
Connecticut State Police	51	12%
Naugatuck	22	5%
East Hartford	18	4%
Clinton	16	4%

An examination of the 396 pursuit events, rather than reports, reveals similar patterns. Fifty-two departments engaged in 5 or fewer pursuit events, including 18 departments that reported engaging in a single pursuit event in 2025. Seven departments reported engaging in 10 or more pursuit events, accounting for 56% of all pursuit events reported in the state that year. Table 3.2 lists the five departments that reported engaging in the most pursuit events in 2025. The State Police report engaging in 51 pursuit events, 13% of all pursuit events in the state. Enfield remains an outlier, reporting 101 events or 26% of all pursuit events in the state.

Table 3. 2: Reported Pursuit Events by Police Department (Top 5)

Police Department	Number of Reported Pursuit Events	% of Total Pursuit Events
Enfield	101	26%
Connecticut State Police	51	13%
Naugatuck	22	6%
Clinton	16	4%
Branford	12	3%

Hartford, West Haven, Weston, Winchester, Windsor Locks, and Woodbridge. South Windsor and West Hartford subsequently reported 4 and 2 pursuits, respectively, for the 2025 calendar year.

²⁶ Pinho, Rute. 2023. Number of Municipal Police Departments in Connecticut. 2023-R-0265. Office of Legislative Research. <https://www.cga.ct.gov/2023/rpt/pdf/2023-R-0265.pdf>.

Pursuit reports indicate that 291 distinct officers served as the primary vehicle operator in pursuits in 2025.²⁷ Most officers were responsible for only one or two pursuit events, but seven officers were identified as the primary operators in more than five pursuit events, accounting for 11% of all pursuit events reported in 2025. All but one of these officers were members of the Enfield Police Department, whose interpretation of pursuit policy (as detailed below) makes them more likely to be identified as engaging in pursuits more frequently than officers in other departments. However, there was one officer from a municipal department in Connecticut who appears to have been the primary vehicle operator in six distinct pursuit events between July and December 2025.

Enfield Police Pursuit Discussion

Enfield accounts for a notable share of police pursuit reports submitted statewide, a pattern that has remained consistent across multiple years of available data. Figure 3.4 shows the number of pursuits reported by Enfield as a share of statewide reports between 2022 and 2025. Since 2022, approximately one in five pursuit reports in Connecticut originated from Enfield.


The disproportionate reporting of pursuits by the Enfield Police Department reflects important differences across police departments in how pursuits are defined and reported. Enfield department leadership interprets pursuit reporting practices as requiring the inclusion and documentation of a broader category of incidents as pursuits than those recorded as pursuits by many other agencies. Specifically, Enfield Police leadership interprets the pursuit statute as requiring that officers must report as a pursuit any incident in which they have a reasonable belief that Connecticut General Statutes §14-223(b)—which defines eluding events as occurrences where a vehicle signaled to stop by an officer in a police vehicle increases its speed in an attempt to escape—applies.²⁸

This can include situations in which an officer initiates a traffic stop, and the driver fails to pull over immediately, even if the interaction lasts only a few seconds. In many cases, these incidents do not develop into sustained or high-speed pursuits. Enfield police leadership acknowledges that their reporting practices capture a broader category of incidents than those recorded as pursuits by many other agencies. Leaders also emphasized that this reporting approach is intentional. By documenting instances of failure to comply with police signals—rather than only prolonged pursuits—the department aims to capture how often drivers fail to stop for police. Accordingly, this data should be interpreted not as an indication of more frequent or dangerous pursuits, but as evidence of a more comprehensive reporting framework.

²⁷ The existing standardized Pursuit Tracking Form identifies the primary pursuit operator. It does not include a field to report the operator submitting the pursuit form or the names of all involved vehicle operators. As a result, this is likely an undercount of the number of officers engaged in any pursuit. Careful review of this field, especially in cases where multiple reports were submitted for the same event, highlights that this field does not capture the full list of officers ever engaged in a pursuit, as well as inconsistencies in reporting. In some cases, multiple pursuit reports for a single pursuit event appear to use the “Primary pursuit vehicle operator” line to capture the operator of the reporting vehicle, whether they were the primary pursuit vehicle or not. In other cases, reports identifying the same event “correctly” identify the same primary pursuit vehicle operator.

²⁸ 14-223(b) states that “No person operating a motor vehicle, when signaled to stop by an officer in a police vehicle using an audible signal device or flashing or revolving lights, shall increase the speed of the motor vehicle in an attempt to escape or elude such police officer...”

Figure 3. 4: Trend in Enfield Pursuit Reports 2022-2025



III.C. Pursuit Reason

The 435 pursuit reports submitted in Connecticut for 2025 contain 262 distinct reasons for engaging in a police pursuit, including formal criminal code numbers, long descriptions, and police shorthand. This variety of responses largely reflects the structure of the state’s standardized Pursuit Tracking Form, which captures reasons for pursuit using an open-text response field. As a result, the same pursuit might be explained with different reasons. Additionally, substantively identical reasons for engaging in pursuit, like speeding, are captured in the data with different terms. Table 3.3 illustrates these data issues. For example, two reports filed by the same department for a multi-car pursuit on May 3rd, 2025, use different language—including the radio shorthand “File 1”—to indicate that the pursuit involved a stolen vehicle. Similarly, three reports from the same department on different dates use different language to describe pursuit of a speeding motorist.

Table 3. 3: Example of Inconsistent Reporting of Reasons for Police Pursuit


Date	Time	Reason for Pursuit
5/3/2025	15:40	Stolen MV
5/3/2025	15:40	File 1
4/5/2025	[Missing]	Speed
8/11/2025	2:00	MV Violation, speeding
9/20/2025	2:18	MV Speed

The POSTC Police Motor Vehicle Pursuit Policy (2021) offers a narrow set of situations in which pursuit is a permissible response to a suspected crime. Per policy, vehicle pursuits are only permissible when “the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver or occupant has committed or is attempting to

commit a crime of violence, or there are exigent circumstances that warrant the need to apprehend the suspect in a timely manner because of the potential for harm to the public.” Most motor vehicle crimes, car thefts, property crimes, non-violent misdemeanors, and non-violent felonies are not justified reasons, absent exigent circumstances, for police pursuit.

Qualitative coding of the reported reasons for pursuit highlights that the most common reason for pursuit is motor vehicle violations. More than half of all pursuit reports (59%) note that a contributing reason the pursuit was initiated was a motor vehicle violation. This includes instances of fleeing, evading police, speeding, misuse of plates, and reckless driving. Forty-one percent of pursuit reports indicate that a suspected criminal offense was a motivating factor in the initiation of the pursuit. Suspected criminal offenses capture both violent and property crimes, as well as some reports that list only “criminal offense,” for which clarifying details on the nature of the crime were not provided. For those reports that included more information on the nature of the suspected criminal offense, 16% suggest pursuits were initiated in response to non-violent property offenses, while 14% were initiated in response to a suspected violent offense. Common property crimes include stolen vehicles, larceny, burglary, and shoplifting. Violent crimes include assaults and attempted assaults—including assaults on officers by ramming or attempting to ram police officers or police vehicles. Other violent crimes that initiate pursuit include kidnapping, use of a firearm, domestic violence, and robbery. A small proportion of reported pursuits were initiated in response to suspicious activity (2%), welfare checks or suicidal ideation (1%), or other reasons that fall outside of these categories (5%). Figure 3.5 summarizes the seven categories produced through hand coding.²⁹

Figure 3. 5: Reported Reasons for Pursuit Initiation



Evidence related to the nature and outcome of police reports is generally captured on video. Most pursuit reports (94%) indicate that in-car video of the incident is available. Only 33% of reports state that external

²⁹ Categories are not mutually exclusive if multiple reasons are given relating to different categories. For this reason, percents do not add up to 100%.

video is similarly available regarding the pursuit. Compared to the availability of in-car video, relatively fewer officers report wearing body-worn cameras during pursuits. Across all reports, 68% of officers report having a body-worn camera during the pursuit, while around a third (31%) report that body-worn cameras were not used.³⁰

III.D. Pursuit Termination and Conclusion

Once engaged, a pursuit can either be terminated—meaning the pursuit was ended at the discretion of a pursuing police officer or supervisor—or concluded—meaning the pursuit was engaged in until the pursued driver stopped of their own volition, crashed, or was brought to a stop through forced stop procedures. The POSTC Police Motor Vehicle Pursuit Policy (2021) requires that “officers involved in the pursuit and their supervisor’s [sic] shall continuously reassess the factors listed [justifying pursuit] to determine whether the pursuit shall continue or be terminated” and advises that police should “terminate the pursuit whenever [they believe] that the risks associated with continued pursuit are greater than the public safety benefit of making an immediate apprehension.” It is important to emphasize that the goal of the policy and related legislation is not to eliminate vehicle pursuits as a policing tactic. However, the policy reads as emphasizing the value of pursuit termination under appropriate circumstances by narrowing the applicable reasons for pursuit and acknowledging that the danger posed by pursuits is non-negligible.

The standard Pursuit Tracking Form does not contain a clear, discrete indicator of whether a pursuit was terminated or concluded. Instead, the form relies on two open-response fields—“location pursuit terminated” and “location pursuit concluded, if not terminated”—as the primary indicators for reporting a pursuit’s end. The data in these fields can be messy. Some reports captured information in both fields, making it unclear if a pursuit was terminated or concluded. Similarly, although the tracking form captures “reason for pursuit termination,” reports indicating a concluded pursuit sometimes include information in this field. Note that the data below are based on estimates after careful data cleaning of imperfect response fields.


Out of 396 pursuit events³¹ approximately 80% were terminated, while 20% were pursued to conclusion. Of the 68 departments that submitted pursuit reports, 35 (51%) reported that all pursuit events they engaged in were terminated. Six departments reported that 100% of the pursuit events they engaged in were brought to conclusion. The Connecticut State Police accounted for nearly a third (31%) of all pursuits that were pursued to conclusion. Of the 51 pursuits engaged by CSP, half (25 events) were pursued to conclusion while 26 were terminated.

³⁰ It should be noted that information on the availability of video documentation of pursuits appears to vary depending on if a pursuit form is typed or handwritten. Logistic regression models examining whether handwritten forms are less likely to indicate the presence of in-car video show no significant differences ($p > .05$). However, handwritten forms are significantly less likely ($p < .000$) to report on the availability of body-worn cameras. This is relevant to check because fields that capture these video media use drop-down menus that are not compatible with handwritten forms. Given this, handwritten forms may need to correct this field manually, which could lead to false upward bias in reporting of the use of these videos.

³¹ It is possible for multiple reports from the same pursuit event to differ in the description of the pursuit ending. In a set of reports from an event on July 2nd, 2025, one report listed the pursuit event as terminated, while another listed it as concluded. Data discrepancies of this type might accurately reflect different endings for different operators (i.e., one car terminated its pursuit while the other did not) or a data error in which the same ending is recorded differently.


Figure 3.6 captures the proportion of pursuit events terminated and the source of the termination compared to the proportion of pursuit events concluded. The majority of terminated pursuits (72% of terminated pursuits, 56% of all pursuits) were terminated by officers, while a quarter (27% of terminated pursuits, 21% of all pursuits) were terminated by a supervisor. Four pursuits (1% of all pursuits) were terminated by others, like dispatchers.

Figure 3. 6: Pursuit Events Terminated or Concluded



The finding that most pursuits were terminated rather than brought to conclusion holds regardless of the reported reason for initiating a pursuit. Figure 3.7 examines the seven broad categories of reasons for pursuit detailed above and the percentage of pursuits in each category that were terminated vs. concluded. In every category, a majority of pursuits were terminated. Suspected violent offenses were the most likely to be pursued to conclusion rather than terminated, a positive reflection of the pursuit policy that largely seeks to limit pursuits to events in which the suspect “has committed or is attempting to commit a crime of violence.” Even still, most of these pursuits (67%) were terminated while only a third (33%) were pursued to conclusion. Examining pursuits that were less likely to fall within the model policy for pursuit justifications, 82% of pursuit events in response to suspected property crime were terminated, while 18% were pursued to conclusion. Eighty-five percent of pursuits initiated in response to motor vehicle violations were similarly terminated compared to 15% pursued to conclusion. It is unclear whether unstated exigent circumstances contributed to the pursuit being brought to a conclusion.


Figure 3. 7: Pursuit Events Terminated or Concluded by Reason for Pursuit



As with the reason for pursuit, the field capturing the reason for its termination relies on open-text responses and therefore contains a large number of distinct reasons. Of the 315 pursuit events that were reported terminated, 223 different reasons were given to explain the termination. Hand coding of these responses into categories suggested that pursuit terminations could be grouped into six categories. These categories are summarized in Figure 3.8.³²

³² Categories are not mutually exclusive if multiple reasons are given relating to different categories. For this reason, percents do not add up to 100%.

Figure 3. 8: Categorical Reasons for Pursuit Terminations



Most terminated pursuits cited the POSTC policy—explicitly or implicitly—as the reason for termination. Approximately one in five terminated pursuits (21%) included an explicit reference to the pursuit falling outside departmental policy or statutory criteria, with explanations such as “did not meet criteria,” “state law and department policy,” or simply “policy.” In addition, 57% of terminated pursuits cited considerations consistent with the model pursuit policy without explicitly naming the policy. Common explanations included “risks outweigh need for immediate apprehension,” “public safety,” or “motor vehicle charges only.”

Another 15% of terminated pursuits were attributed to the suspect fleeing, evading, or otherwise being lost by pursuing officers. In some cases, these explanations were accompanied by references to policy guidance concerning the risks posed to the public by continuing the pursuit. Five percent of terminated pursuits cited, without further explanation, a decision by either the vehicle operator or a supervisor to terminate the pursuit. Although these responses likely reflect policy-based decisions, the rationale for termination was not made explicit in the data.

A small proportion of terminated pursuits (3%) cited alternative reasons for termination, including crossing municipal boundaries, transferring responsibility for the pursuit to another agency, or changes in the suspect’s driving behavior or destination. Finally, three pursuit events classified as terminated indicated that the terminations resulted from crashes. These reports may have been misreported as terminated when, in fact, the pursuits were concluded.

Because the standard Pursuit Tracking Form does not include a field for “reason pursuit concluded,” most (74%) concluded pursuits do not list a reason for their end. However, 21 pursuit events reported as pursued to conclusion used the “reason for pursuit termination” field to detail the nature of the pursuit conclusion. Of those that reported concluding rather than being called off/terminated, 5 (6%) state that the suspect fled or otherwise evaded officers, suggesting that these reports might be better categorized as terminated

pursuits. Another 12 (15%) reported that the pursuit ended because the pursued vehicle stopped, was disabled, or the suspect was apprehended. Four concluded pursuits (5%) were due to crashes.

III.E. Pursuit Outcomes – Damage, Collision, and Injury

One reason pursuit policy has come under increased scrutiny in recent years and has been targeted for revision is the heightened risk of harm, including damage to property, injury, and loss of life associated with pursuits. In 2025, 65 pursuit events (16%) reportedly resulted in a collision: 40% of pursuits engaged to conclusion did so, and 10% of pursuits reported as terminated—called off by the officer or supervisor—also resulted in a collision. In fact, half (33) of the pursuits that resulted in a collision were reported as terminated.³³ Twenty-eight police departments were involved in pursuit events that resulted in a collision. A third (34%) of pursuit events that resulted in a collision were reported by the State Police. Another tenth (10%) of reported pursuit collisions involved the Waterbury police. Compared with terminated pursuits, pursuits engaged to conclusion are significantly more likely to involve a collision: logistic regression models predicting the odds of a collision find that concluded pursuits have nearly 6 times the odds of a collision as terminated pursuits (OR = 5.70, $p < .000$).

Unlike collisions, which are captured on the standard Pursuit Tracking Form using a binary Yes/No response menu, data on injuries resulting from pursuit are captured in an open-text response field. This may explain the high level of missingness in injury data. Almost half (44%) of events did not include information on whether the pursuit resulted in injury, including 46% of terminated pursuits and 39% of concluded pursuits.³⁴ However, 27 pursuit events (7%) resulted in injuries: 19% of concluded pursuits and 4% of terminated pursuits. Fifteen police departments were involved in pursuit events that resulted in injury. Thirty percent of the pursuits (8 pursuit events) that resulted in injury occurred during pursuits involving the State Police. Though most concluded pursuits (81%) do not result in injury, as with collisions, logistic regression models predicting the odds of injury find that pursuits that are pursued to conclusion have 6 times the odds of resulting in injury compared to those that are terminated (OR = 5.81, $p < .000$). That 12 of the 27 reported injuries are associated with pursuits that were terminated suggests either that the form is capturing the nature of these pursuits incorrectly or that any pursuit, even those ended by officer or supervisor discretion, can result in injury. As with injury, damage resulting from pursuit is captured using an open-text response field. The majority of reports (83%) did not include information on whether the pursuit had resulted in damage. Seventy pursuit events (18%) indicate some damage to persons or property caused by pursuits, with the damage described ranging from “Violator Vehicle minor” to “Suspect vehicle struck utility pole after becoming disabled by spike strips, damage to two Derby Cruisers after suspect rammed them.” Twenty-seven police departments were involved in pursuit events that resulted in damage. Thirty-five percent of the pursuits (25 pursuit events) that resulted in damage occurred in pursuits involving the State Police. Just under half (45%) of concluded pursuits and 11% of terminated pursuits indicate some type of damage resulting from the pursuit. Thirty-four of the 70 reports (49%) that indicated some form of damage were from pursuits that were otherwise indicated as terminated. An illustration of the potential harm caused by even terminated pursuits includes a report indicating that the

³³ Given that a collision can include both major, disabling accidents and less severe contact between vehicles, it is possible for collisions to occur and not result in a vehicle stopping.

³⁴ Making this a required field or clarifying the branching logic of the form and when it is appropriate to skip this field, would make it easier to affirm the difference between missing data and a response confirming no injuries occurred.

pursuit was terminated because the crime was “Only a suspected stolen MV” and thus fell outside of police policy. Despite the termination, the pursuit resulted in multiple injuries and property damage: “Minor injuries to [Officer] and one civilian, disabling damage to police cruiser on rear driver's side, functional damage to civilian vehicle not involved with the pursuit.” Again, logistic regression models predicting the odds of damage find that concluded pursuits pose a greater risk of harm than terminated pursuits. Pursuits that are pursued to conclusion are nearly 7 times more likely to end in damage than pursuits that are terminated (OR = 6.76, $p < .000$).

III.F. Offender Characteristics

More than a third (35%) of police pursuit reports contain no information about the offender. Terminated pursuits—42% of which lack any offender information—are significantly less likely to contain offender information ($p < .000$) than concluded pursuits—8% of which lack any offender information. The absence of information on offenders is a logical omission in terminated pursuits when an offender is never identified or the case is not followed up.

Among the 211 pursuit events for which the age of the offender is indicated, the average age of offending drivers is 32³⁵. Offender ages ranged from 12 to 91. Seven (3%) pursuit events included an offender who was 16 or younger. Age was not significantly associated with pursuit outcome. Younger drivers were no more likely than older drivers to engage in pursuits that resulted in damage, collisions, or injury. Similarly, there was no difference in offender age between pursuits that were terminated and those that were concluded, conditional on the offender's age being known.

Among the 247 pursuit events for which offender criminal history is indicated, 63% of offenders were known to have a criminal history while 31% did not have criminal histories. In 65% of pursuits engaged to conclusion, the operator had a criminal history. Similarly, in 62% of terminated pursuits, the operator had a criminal history. Criminal history was not significantly associated with pursuit outcome. Those with criminal histories were no more likely to engage in pursuits that resulted in damage, collisions, or injury. Similarly, there was no difference in the relationship between criminal history and whether a pursuit was terminated or pursued to conclusion.

Notably, 15 pursuit reports state that the offender's criminal history is unknown or pending, even though this field is captured via a Yes/No dropdown menu. The entry of alternative responses is not explained by departments’ use of alternative pursuit forms; 12 of the 15 responses are handwritten on the standard form. This suggests that these question responses should be revised to allow all respondents the same response options. It might also raise questions about whether the data contains false positives or false negatives regarding operators’ criminal history, especially in brief pursuit engagements, due to the forced-choice nature of the response field.

III.G. Pursuit Review

POSTC Police Motor Vehicle Pursuit Policy (2021) requires that pursuits be “reviewed by the appropriate supervisor or supervisors to determine if policy has been complied with and to detect and correct any training deficiencies.” Compliance with this aspect of the policy appears high. The majority of pursuit

³⁵ In one report, five offender ages were identified: “13, 13, 13, 15, 16.” For this analysis, we took the average of those ages. Another report described the offender's age as “20s” and was instead assigned the age of 25 for this analysis.

reports (98%) were reviewed by a supervisor. Just 1% of pursuit reports were not reviewed, while another 1% did not indicate if they were reviewed.

Most pursuits—85% of all pursuit events—were found to be within department pursuit policy. Only 40 pursuits (10%) were determined to fall outside of policy. Fifteen police departments reported at least one pursuit that fell outside of policy. More than a third (38%) of pursuits outside of policy involved the State Police (15 events). An additional 12% of pursuits outside of policy involved the New London police (5 pursuit events). In 18 pursuit events, no determination was made as to whether the pursuit was within or outside of policy.

Results from logistic regression models predicting the odds of a pursuit being outside of policy found that pursuits resulting in injury were significantly more likely to be determined outside of policy than those that did not. A pursuit resulting in injury had more than three times the odds of being determined outside of policy (OR = 3.63, $p < .05$). However, other pursuit outcomes—collisions and damage—were not significantly associated with a pursuit being determined as outside of policy. Similarly, there was no significant difference in whether a pursuit was determined to be outside of policy, depending on whether it was terminated or engaged to conclusion.

IV. Data Quality Issues

As acknowledged throughout this report, the police pursuit reporting process and the standardized Pursuit Tracking Form pose numerous data challenges and deficiencies, making it difficult to obtain a complete view of police pursuits in Connecticut. This section details several of those shortcomings, their effects on analysis, and, when possible, suggestions for improvement.

Discrepancies between Connecticut Statute and the POSTC Police Motor Vehicle Pursuit Policy

As noted throughout this report, there are several instances where the language of the POSTC policy appears at odds with the language of state statute. Of particular relevance to this report and its findings are the exact definition of pursuit and the specific reporting requirements when a pursuit event occurs. These discrepancies leave room for interpretation, resulting in uneven documentation. While it is for public safety leaders to determine the best, most effective approach to resolving these discrepancies, clarifying them—including potential proposals for amended legislative language—would improve data quality, standardize the meaning of pursuit, and increase transparency.

Incomplete Uptake of Pursuit Form and Reporting Policy

Despite the standardization of the police pursuit form in 2021, 6% of pursuit reports submitted for 2025 used a different reporting form. In 2025, the police departments in Avon, Branford, Montville, and Norwalk used only alternative forms when submitting pursuit reports, while three other police departments submitted a portion of their pursuit reports using the standard pursuit form and a portion using alternative forms. Variation in the type of pursuit form used can complicate analysis when forms contain different information fields, producing missing data not due to response error but because the same information was not captured. To the extent possible, this analysis sought to align data captured on other forms with the data fields in the standard Pursuit Tracking Form to enable the inclusion of those forms in this report.

The use of alternative pursuit reporting forms also implicitly acknowledges that compliance with pursuit reporting, and the pursuit policy more generally, varies across departments. As discussed in Section III.A, there are inconsistencies in the reporting requirements outlined in state statute and in the POSTC pursuit policy. Beyond policy language, departments also vary in their interpretation of reporting requirements, especially regarding what constitutes a pursuit, who is required to report, and whether brief, terminated police chases must be reported. Readers should be cautious when interpreting a lack of reported pursuits as a lack of pursuit events. It is unknown from this data how many pursuit events occurred that were not reported or how many of the 30 police departments that did not report any pursuits might have engaged in pursuits but did not report them through the required channels.

Much as a lack of pursuit form does not mean a department did not engage in any pursuits, it is also the case that officers not named on these forms may have been involved in pursuits. As noted in Section III.B, the existing Pursuit Tracking Form intends to capture “primary pursuit vehicle operator” and does not contain a field for reporting vehicle operator. Some departments annotate their reports to indicate the author or vehicle operator if they were not the primary operator; others appear to use the primary operator field to refer to the reporting vehicle operator, whether or not that was the primary operator. As a result, the data on pursuit-involved officers is messy and likely incomplete, with some officers who engaged in pursuits in 2025 not identified in the compiled data. Public Act 19-90(a) states that each law

enforcement unit is responsible for maintaining a record of any incident where a police officer engages in a pursuit, including the name of the police officer. However, these reports do not constitute a complete list of all pursuit-involved officers. A revised Pursuit Tracking Form that captures each officer involved would increase transparency and accountability regarding officer involvement.

Handwritten Pursuit Forms

The majority of pursuit reports received for 2025 (71%) featured typed responses, while the remaining 29% of reports were submitted with handwritten responses. As with alternative forms used to capture pursuit data, handwritten responses can affect data quality in several ways. First, handwritten responses can be difficult to decipher. Second, some items on the standardized Pursuit Tracking Form are formatted as drop-down menus that include discrete response options. In some cases, these drop-downs may pre-populate printed versions (e.g., by defaulting to a response category) that a handwritten form would need to affirm or correct manually. This might result in some false positives in the data, for example, the form automatically indicating that the officer was wearing a body-worn camera when, in fact, no camera was present. In other cases, no response was selected from these drop-down options, resulting in missing data. Reports submitted on different reporting forms were significantly more likely to be handwritten ($p < .001$), though this may, in part, reflect variation in departmental practices in the few departments that do not use the standardized form.

Other Reporting Inconsistencies

In determining whether reported pursuits were part of the same event or two separate events, a useful data point was the pursuit time. However, a close examination of this field revealed that, while most time points appear to be in military (24-hour) time, some reports may have been in standard (12-hour) time. For example, two reports submitted for June 10th, 2025, pursuits differ in how they report the time, with one department reporting the event as occurring at 21:08 and the other reporting it at 9:08. Standardizing reporting methods to eliminate these minor discrepancies can improve data quality and make it easier to spot reporting overlaps.

Important Missing Data

Though researchers have found that most pursuits are short in distance and duration (lasting approximately 1–5 minutes) and occur primarily at low speeds, equivalent data on the distance and duration of pursuits in Connecticut are not explicitly captured in the pursuit form. While the form captures the initiated and terminated locations, the data is not of sufficient quality to derive useful distance measures. Table 4.1 highlights examples of the limited quality of the location data. For example, some forms report the location only as the town while others describe pursuits as occurring along a single street, without additional information to determine the distance traveled. Other reports include conflicting information about the end location. For example, a January 3rd pursuit reported both a location where the pursuit was terminated and a location where it concluded. Improved reporting of location and duration could clarify whether pursuits in Connecticut are consistent with national findings of brief pursuits.

Table 4. 1: Examples of Inconsistencies in Data Capturing Pursuit Location

Police Department	Date	Time	Location Pursuit Initiated	Location Pursuit Terminated	Location Pursuit Concluded
Farmington	1/3/2025	14:41	Meadow Rd at Garden St	Farmington Ave at I-84	Meadow Rd at Main St
Connecticut State Police	1/10/2025	12:44	Hartford	Hartford	
Naugatuck	1/15/2025	4:34	Cross St	Cross St	

Other Data Reporting Considerations


The standard form contains 20 response items, the majority (15) of which are open-ended text responses. This use of open-ended rather than enumerated or categorical questions makes it difficult to compare pursuit data across events and renders many aspects of reported police pursuits subjective. Moreover, the form is not currently integrated into any data management system. Analyzing or summarizing the data efficiently requires cumbersome reformatting into more usable variables and structures. For this report, data were entered manually from PDF forms submitted via email. This manual data entry process poses an increased risk of data entry errors.

The form also fails to capture certain information relevant to the POST Council’s model policy and to state statute, limiting the ability to assess adherence to the policy and the spirit of associated laws. For example, the form does not capture details on pursuit tactics, including vehicle standards or intervention techniques. It also does not easily distinguish between police injury, bystander injury, or suspect injury, and limits its questions about damage to “damage to vehicles involved,” leaving no directive to detail damage to property. Improving the form will enable officers to efficiently capture the varied reasons for pursuit (including those that fall outside policy), and detailing the pursuit event and tactics is important for reducing officer burden while also improving adherence to pursuit policy and public safety.

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Appendix A: Police Officer Standards and Training Council General Notice 19-04 and 21-10



STATE OF CONNECTICUT
DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY SERVICES AND PUBLIC PROTECTION
Police Officer Standards and Training Council
Connecticut Police Academy

GENERAL NOTICE 19-04

To: Chief Law Enforcement Officers, Training Officers, Protective Services, and Resident Troopers

From: Karen Boisvert 
Police Academy Administrator

Date: **December 6, 2019**

Subject: **Council Action – Adoption of the Updated Model Pursuit Policy**

At its meeting on November 14, 2019, the Police Officer Standards and Training Council adopted the attached updated Model Pursuit Policy. This policy has been updated in accordance with Public Act 19-90, Section 5, which updates Connecticut General Statute 14-283a "*Adoption of state-wide policy for pursuits by police officers. Reports.*" The policy is in effect as of the date of this notice and supersedes any and all previous versions of this policy.

The revised Policy is attached to this General Notice.

POSTC Model Policy

Police Motor Vehicle Pursuit Policy

Sec. 1. Purpose

The purpose of this policy is to establish a Uniform Statewide Pursuit Policy in accordance with the provisions of 14-283a-1 to 14-283a-4, inclusive and section 14-283a of the Connecticut General Statutes. This policy shall serve as the minimum standard for all police pursuits in Connecticut, involving POSTC Certified Police Officers. Additional requirements adopted by an individual police agency shall not conflict with any provision of this policy.

Sec. 2. Policy

Pursuits of fleeing motor vehicles may present a danger to the lives of the public, officers, and those vehicle occupants involved in the pursuit. Each police agency shall be responsible for assisting police officers in the safe performance of their duties.

Sec. 3. Definitions

1. "Pursuit" means an attempt by a police officer in an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend any occupant of another moving motor vehicle, when the driver of the fleeing vehicle is attempting to avoid apprehension by maintaining or increasing the speed of such vehicle or by ignoring the police officer's attempt to stop such vehicle.
2. "Authorized emergency vehicle" means a police vehicle equipped with operable emergency equipment, including audible siren and red or blue flashing lights, while such vehicle is being operated by a police officer.
3. "Primary unit" means the police vehicle operated by a police officer that initiates a pursuit or any police vehicle operated by a police officer that assumes control of the pursuit.
4. "Secondary unit" means any police vehicle operated by a police officer that becomes involved as a backup to the primary unit and follows the primary unit at a safe distance.
5. "Supervisor" means a person designated by the police agency to have supervisory control over the operation of the agency's vehicles during a pursuit.
6. "Communications" means the central dispatch center or personnel staffing the central dispatch center of the police agency in the jurisdiction where the pursuit is occurring.
7. "Uniform Statewide Pursuit Policy, "known as "the policy" or "this policy," means Sections 14-283a-1 to 14-283a-4, inclusive, of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.
8. "Police agency" means the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety, including local police officers serving in municipalities with a Resident State Trooper, or an organized municipal police department.

9. "Crime of Violence" -An offense in which physical force, the attempted use or threatened use of physical force, is used against another person(s) for the purpose of, injuring, damaging or abusing another person(s), or any offense that is a felony and that involves a substantial risk that physical force against another person may be used in the course of committing the offense.

Sec. 4. Procedures

A. Initiation of Pursuit

- 1. A police officer may only engage another vehicle in a pursuit if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver or occupant has committed or is attempting to commit a crime of violence, or there are exigent circumstances that warrant the need to apprehend the suspect in a timely manner because of the potential for harm to the public if the apprehension does not occur. The officers must be able to articulate the exigent need to apprehend the driver or occupant because of the potential harm or risk to the public.*
- 2. Offenses that constitute Infractions, property crimes, (to include stolen motor vehicles), non-violent misdemeanors and non-violent felonies shall not be justification to engage in a pursuit of another vehicle, absent articulable exigent circumstances.*
- 3. The officers involved in the pursuit and their supervisor's shall continuously reassess the factors listed above to determine whether the pursuit shall continue or be terminated.*
- 4. A pursuit shall not be undertaken, even if allowable by other provisions of this policy, unless and until the officer, based upon the information available to him/her at the time, shall make an objectively reasonable determination that the threat of imminent death or serious physical injury to the officer, the public or both, created by the pursuit is less than the immediate or potential danger to the public, should the suspect(s) or occupant(s) remain at large. A decision to engage in a pursuit shall be based upon the following:*
 - a. The underlying crime for which the operator or occupants are suspected of committing;*
 - b. Whether the identity of the operator or occupant is known and apprehension by other means is possible;*
 - c. That the immediate danger to the public and the police officer created by the pursuit is less than the immediate danger to the public should the occupants of the pursued vehicle remain at large;*
 - d. Location, speed, direction of other traffic, population density, type of vehicle being pursued and operators driving behaviors;*
 - e. Environmental factors such as, weather, time of the day, visibility;*
 - f. Relative capability of the police vehicle(s) and the vehicle being pursued;*
 - g. Road conditions, including surface type, wet, icy, dry roadway. Road typography, traffic controls;*
 - h. The presence of other people in the police vehicle;*
 - i. Population density, vehicular and pedestrian traffic.*

Sec. 5. Pursuit Operations

1. All authorized emergency vehicle operations shall be conducted in strict conformity with Sections 14-283a-1 to 14-283a-4, inclusive, of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, and section 14-283a of the Connecticut General Statutes.
2. Upon engaging in or entering into a pursuit, the pursuing vehicle shall activate appropriate warning equipment. An audible warning device shall be used during all such pursuits.
3. Upon engaging in a pursuit, the police officer shall immediately notify communications of the location, direction and speed of the pursuit, the description of the pursued vehicle and the initial purpose of the stop. The police officers shall keep communications updated on the pursuit. Communications personnel shall immediately notify any available supervisor of the agency or agencies involved in such pursuit, clear the radio channel of non-emergency traffic, and relay necessary information to other police officers of the involved police agency or agencies, and adjacent police agencies in whose direction the pursuit is proceeding.
4. When engaged in a pursuit, police officers shall drive with due regard for the safety of persons and property.
5. Unless circumstances dictate otherwise, a pursuit shall consist of no more than three police vehicles, one of which shall be designated as the primary unit. No other personnel shall join the pursuit unless instructed to participate by a supervisor.
6. The primary unit involved in the pursuit shall become secondary when the fleeing vehicle comes under police air surveillance or when another unit has been assigned primary responsibility.

Sec. 6. Supervisory Responsibilities

1. When made aware of a pursuit, the appropriate supervisor shall evaluate the situation and conditions that caused the pursuit to be initiated, the need to continue the pursuit, and shall monitor incoming information, coordinate and direct activities as needed to ensure that proper procedures are used. Such supervisor shall also have the authority to terminate the pursuit. When the agency supervisor communicates a termination directive, all agency vehicles shall disengage warning devices and cease the pursuit.
2. Where possible, a supervisory police officer shall respond to the location where a vehicle has been stopped following a pursuit.

Sec. 7. Pursuit Tactics

1. Police officers not engaged in the pursuit as the primary or secondary unit shall not normally follow the pursuit on parallel streets unless authorized by a supervisor or when it is possible to conduct such an operation without unreasonable hazard to other vehicular or pedestrian traffic.
2. When feasible, available patrol units having the most prominent markings and emergency lights shall be used to pursue, particularly as the primary unit. When a pursuit is initiated by other than a marked patrol unit, such unit shall become the secondary unit when a marked unit becomes available as the primary unit, and such unit shall disengage from the pursuit when another marked unit becomes available as the secondary unit.
3. Motorcycles may be used for a pursuit in exigent circumstances including, but not limited to, situations where a felony has been committed, deadly force has been used by a vehicle occupant, or the pursuit is necessary to preserve a life, provided that weather and related

conditions allow such pursuit to continue. Motorcycles shall disengage from the pursuit when support from marked patrol units becomes available.

4. Once the pursued vehicle is stopped, police officers shall utilize appropriate police officer safety tactics and shall be aware of the necessity to utilize only the force the police officer reasonably believes to be necessary to take occupants into custody.
5. All intervention techniques short of deadly force shall be used when it is possible to do so in safety and when the police officers utilizing them have received appropriate training in their use. Such techniques shall include, but not be limited to, boxing in the vehicle or using controlled termination *devices such as stop sticks*.
6. Roadblocks are prohibited unless specifically authorized by the supervisor in charge after consideration of the necessity of applying deadly physical force to end the pursuit.

Sec. 8. Use of Firearms during a Pursuit

1. Officers shall not discharge their firearms at a moving vehicle or its occupants unless, the occupants are using, or threatened the use of deadly physical force, against the officer or another person present, by means other than the vehicle.

a. This does not preclude exigent circumstances such as, but not limited to, where the officer reasonably believes there are no other means available to avert the threat of the vehicle, or if such vehicle is being utilized as a weapon against the officer(s), or another person, such as in a vehicle ramming attack.

b. No officer should intentionally position his or her body into the path of a fleeing motor vehicle, unless such action is a tactic approved by the law enforcement unit, that employs such police officer and in accordance with an established written policy. Whenever possible, the involved officer should make an effort to move to an area of safety if the vehicle becomes a threat, including retreating from the threat, if practical.

Sec. 9. Termination of the Pursuit

1. The police officer serving as the primary unit engaged in the pursuit shall continually re-evaluate and assess the pursuit situation, including all of the initiating factors, and terminate the pursuit whenever he or she reasonably believes that the risks associated with continued pursuit are greater than the public safety benefit of making an immediate apprehension.
2. The pursuit may be terminated by the primary unit at any time.
3. A supervisor may order the termination of a pursuit at any time and shall order the termination of a pursuit when the potential danger to the public outweighs the need immediate apprehension. Such decision shall be based on information known to the supervisor at the time of the pursuit.
4. A pursuit may be terminated if the identity of the occupants has been determined, immediate apprehension is not necessary to protect the public or police officers, and apprehension at a later time is feasible.
5. A pursuit may be terminated when the police officers are prevented from communicating with their supervisors, communications or other police officers.

6. *A pursuit shall be terminated if the police officer knows or is reasonably certain, that the fleeing motor vehicle is being operated by a juvenile and the suspected offense is not a violent felony.*

Sec. 10. Inter-Jurisdictional Pursuits

1. The primary unit shall notify communications when it is likely that a pursuit will continue into a neighboring police agency's area of law enforcement responsibility or cross the state line. Municipal police agencies and the State Police shall notify each other whenever entering the other's area of law enforcement responsibility.
2. A pursuit into a bordering state shall comply with the laws of both states and any applicable inter-agency agreements.
3. In all cases where a pursuit enters an area of law enforcement responsibility of a police agency other than that of the initiating police agency, the police agency in pursuit shall be responsible for immediately notifying the police agency responsible for such area. The desk officer or duty supervisor for the police agency responsible for such area shall determine if assistance is necessary and police officers from police agencies other than the initiating agency shall not join the outside pursuit unless:
 - a. Directed by such duty supervisor or desk officer; or
 - b. The involved pursuit unit is unable to request assistance; or
 - c. The situation demands immediate assistance. The supervisors of the respective police agencies involved in the pursuit shall communicate with each other to determine the respective responsibilities of each police agency and to determine which police agency will assume primary operational control of the pursuit. The supervisors shall also communicate with each other regarding any external conditions pertinent to the continued conduct of the pursuit. Communications between police agencies shall be controlled by inter-agency police radio systems, if they exist, or by telephone, or by both.
4. In all cases where the pursuit enters a municipality without a regularly organized police department, notification shall be made to the State Police troop responsible for that area. Such troop shall maintain radio communications with all local police officers serving in any such municipality.
5. *Agencies pursuing a vehicle into another jurisdiction must most notify that jurisdiction as soon as practical, provided that agency with all available information pertinent to the pursuit, including but not limited to:*
 1. *The reason(s) for the pursuit, or primary offense the driver or occupant(s) are believed to have committed*
 2. *Location, speed, and direction of travel*
 3. *Vehicle and occupant(s) description*
 4. *The number of vehicles and agencies involved in the pursuit*
 5. *Whether assistance is requested/needed or not*
 6. *Other available information as to the conditions of the pursuit*

The pursuing agency will notify the other jurisdiction whether or not the pursuit has been terminated or is leaving their jurisdiction.

Any agency involved in the pursuit may, at its discretion, choose to terminate its involvement in a pursuit at any time. The supervisor and the police officers involved in the pursuit shall make their own determination whether their officers shall enter, continue or terminate the pursuit within their jurisdiction.

Sec. 11. Post-Pursuit Reporting

1. Whenever a police officer engages in a pursuit, the police officer shall file a written report on the appropriate form required by his or her agency describing the circumstances. This report shall be reviewed by the appropriate supervisor or supervisors to determine if policy has been complied with and to detect and correct any training deficiencies.
2. Each police agency shall periodically analyze its police pursuit activity and identify any additions, deletions or modifications warranted in agency pursuit procedures.
3. *Post-Pursuit reports shall be completed for each police pursuit in accordance with department policy and training.*
4. *In accordance with Section 14-283a-1 to 14-283a-4, inclusive and section 14-283a of the Connecticut General Statutes Not later than January 31, 2020, and annually thereafter, each Chief of Police and the Commissioner of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall submit an annual report to the Police Officers Standards and Training Council regarding pursuits by police officers, on the standardized form developed and promulgated by POSTC*
5. *Each police agency involved in the pursuit must report their involvement to POSTC on the designated reporting form. Departments shall indicate on the form whether they were the initiating agency or a secondary unit.*

Sec. 12 Other Pursuit Considerations

1. *High speed operation - A police officer in pursuit may operate their vehicle at a speed that the condition of the vehicle, existing road, traffic, environmental conditions, and the officer's driving abilities will safely permit.*
2. *Number of involved pursuit vehicles - No more than three police vehicles shall be actively involved in a pursuit, unless directed otherwise by a commander, superior officer, or supervisor, however, all police officers should be alert to the progress and location of any nearby and ongoing pursuit.*
3. *Offensive driving tactics are limited - Deliberate contact between vehicles, (i.e., intentional collision, PIT Maneuver, or ramming) shall not be attempted unless permission is obtained from a supervisor, in accordance with established written policy*
4. *Spacing of Vehicles - All police units in active pursuit shall space themselves at reasonable and safe distances to permit adequate braking and reaction times if any preceding vehicle stops, slows, turns, becomes disabled or collides with any vehicle or object.*

5. *Police officers shall operate available emergency warning lights and their vehicle siren to alert other motorists to unexpected pursuit vehicle maneuvers.*
6. *A police pursuit vehicle entering any intersection against traffic control signals or signs shall slow to safe speeds and be prepared to slow or stop to avoid any collision.*

Sec. 13. Forced Stop Procedures (Alternative Measures)

1. *Forced stop procedures, to include but not limited to PIT Maneuver, Boxing-in, and Intentional collision. Roadblocks), short of deadly force, may be considered to stop a fleeing vehicle;*
 2. *Forced stop procedures may be considered when the necessity for an immediate apprehension outweighs the dangers presented to all parties involved and innocent persons.*
 3. *Forcing vehicles to stop usually presents serious safety hazards to participants and any innocent persons who are present.*
 4. *Forced stop procedures must be reasonably and properly applied by police officers who have received appropriate training in their use and have received authorization from their supervisor, absent exigent circumstances.*
 5. *Forced stop procedures shall be conducted in accordance with department policy and training.*
- A. *Roadblocks*
1. *Use of a roadblock, ramming or forcing a vehicle from the roadway may be employed if deadly force can be reasonably applied to apprehend one of the following persons, after all other reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or would be ineffective;*
 - *A dangerous fleeing felon - A person for whom there is reasonable cause to believe that the person has committed a violent felony involving an actual or threatened attack which the police officer has reasonable cause to believe could or has resulted in death or serious physical injury; or*
 - *Any person who is operating a motor vehicle recklessly and in such a manner as to be reasonably likely to cause death or serious injury to any other person should they be allowed to continue operation of the vehicle.*
 - *The use of a roadblock shall be used in accordance with department policy and training.*
- B. *Boxing-In*
1. *Boxing in shall only be performed at relatively low speeds. The use of such a tactic must be carefully coordinated with all involved vehicles, taking into consideration the circumstances and conditions apparent at the time, as well as the potential risk of injury to police officers, the public and the occupants of the violator vehicle.*

2. *Boxing in normally requires two or more police units to position themselves around the violator to form a box at low speeds pursuits. Once the fleeing vehicle is blocked, the police pursuit vehicles slowly and gradually reduce their speed, causing the violator to stop.*
3. *It must be anticipated that a violator may attempt to maneuver past the lead blocking vehicle or intentionally collide with it or one of the other blocking vehicles to move out of the box.*
4. *Boxing-in techniques shall be used in accordance with department policy and training.*
- C. *Intentional Collision of the Offending Vehicle*
 1. *A deliberate contact between a police vehicle and a violator's vehicle and is intended to cause the violator to spin or leave the roadway in a slow and controlled manner.*
 2. *This technique should be used in accordance with department policy and training.*
 3. *When considering intentional collision of a violator, each police officer and supervisor must be aware that these actions may result in serious physical injury or death and may activate the vehicle airbags or fuel system shut-offs causing the police vehicle to become disabled.*
- D. *Tire Deflation Devices – Stop Sticks*
 1. *Police officers must first complete a department required training course on the use of Tire Deflation Devices. These devices shall only be used in accordance with department policy.*
 2. *Stop Sticks shall not be deployed to stop Motorcycles, or other vehicles with less than four (4) wheels.*

Sec. 14. Vehicle Pursuit Training

Police officers who drive police vehicles shall be given initial and biennial update training in the agency's pursuit policy and in safe driving tactics. The provisions of Sections 14- 283a-1 to 14-283a-4, inclusive, of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies shall be a part of the curriculum for all police basic recruit-training and re-certification programs in Connecticut.

1. *Pursuit Training Programs shall consist of:*
 - a. *Knowledge of applicable statutes*
 - b. *Court decisions impacting police pursuits*
 - c. *Department policy*
 - d. *Supervisory and individual responsibilities in a police pursuit*
 - e. *Reporting requirements*
 - f. *Inter-jurisdictional considerations*
 - g. *Pursuit driving skills and techniques.*



STATE OF CONNECTICUT
DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY SERVICES AND PUBLIC PROTECTION
Police Officer Standards and Training Council
Connecticut Police Academy

GENERAL NOTICE 21-10

To: Chief Law Enforcement Officers
Training Officers
Protective Services
Resident Troopers

From: Karen Boisvert 
Academy Administrator

Date: November 29, 2021

Subject: Pursuit POSTC Model Policy Revised 11/18/21

At the November 18, 2021, regular meeting, the Police Officer Standards and Training Council approved the following changes to the Pursuit POSTC Model Policy. The changes are located on page 8 of the policy and have been highlighted for easy identification. A Word version of the updated policy is located on the POST website under Latest News and/or Featured Links; **[Police Motor Vehicle Pursuit Policy Link.](#)**

1. **EXCEPTIONS**

a. IMMEDIATE ACTION - Forced stop procedures utilizing the tire deflation devices must be reasonably and properly applied by police officers who have received appropriate training in their use and have received authorization from their supervisor. Prior authorization shall not be required in exigent circumstances involving a rapidly evolving commission of a violent crime, requiring the police officer to take immediate action.

b. PURSUIT PREVENTION - Prior to attempting a motor vehicle stop or after stopping a motor vehicle, situations may arise where a police officer reasonably believes that the operator may attempt to; escape, elude law enforcement or otherwise initiate a pursuit. Officers may consider a prophylactic measure, thereby preventing the engagement in a pursuit by utilizing tire deflation devices. The officer employing such measures will comply with all additional requirements under this policy.

Questions or comments may be directed to my attention either by e-mail karen.boisvert@ct.gov or phone 203-427-2601.

KB:kb

Appendix B: Connecticut Police Officer Standards and Training Council Pursuit Reporting Form



STATE OF CONNECTICUT

DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY SERVICES AND PUBLIC PROTECTION

Police Officer Standards and Training Council Connecticut Police Academy

Pursuit Tracking Form

Department Name: _____

Primary ☐ Secondary ☐

1. Reason for pursuit: _____
2. Date and time of pursuit: _____
3. Primary pursuit vehicle operator: _____
4. Type of vehicle utilized in pursuit: _____
5. In car video: Yes/No
6. Body worn camera: Yes/No
7. Location pursuit initiated: _____
8. Location pursuit terminated: _____
9. Location pursuit concluded, if not terminated: _____
10. Who terminated pursuit: _____
11. Reason for pursuit termination: _____
12. Weather conditions: _____
13. Number of police vehicle(s) involved: _____
14. Was there a collision as a result of the pursuit: Yes/No
15. Injuries resulting from the pursuit: _____
16. Describe damage to vehicles involved if question #14 was answered Yes:

17. Age of offender involved in pursuit: _____
18. Does offender have a criminal history? Yes/No
19. External video available: Yes/No
20. Was pursuit reviewed Yes/No, findings of supervisor, provide a brief narrative: _____

Please submit completed forms to: PursuitForms@ct.gov

Appendix C: Pursuit Reports Submitted by Department

Law enforcement agencies are responsible for identifying, investigating, and reporting incidents that meet the statutory and policy definitions of a police pursuit. The Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy is responsible only for analyzing submitted reports and does not participate in the identification or investigation of incidents. Table C.1 reflects the number of reports submitted to the IMRP as of March 18, 2026. Five departments submitted reports after the reporting deadline; although those reports were excluded from the annual analysis, they have been incorporated into the state database.

Table C. 1: Police Pursuit Reports Submitted by Police Department

Department	Number of Reports Submitted by 3/18/26	Percent of Total Reports	Number of Reports Submitted after 3/18/26
Ansonia	0	0	0
Avon	2	0.46	0
Berlin	4	0.92	0
Bethel	0	0	0
Bloomfield	2	0.46	0
Branford	13	2.99	0
Bridgeport	2	0.46	1
Bristol	5	1.15	0
Brookfield	4	0.92	0
Canton	0	0	0
Cheshire	2	0.46	0
Clinton	16	3.68	0
Coventry	0	0	0
Cromwell	2	0.46	0
Connecticut State Police	51	11.72	0
CT Environmental Police	1	0.23	0
Danbury	0	0	0
Darien	1	0.23	0
Derby	3	0.69	0
Department of Motor Vehicle	3	0.69	0
East Hartford	18	4.14	0
East Haven	11	2.53	0
East Lyme	2	0.46	0
East Windsor	0	0	0
Easton	0	0	0
Enfield	109	25.06	0
Fairfield	0	0	0
Farmington	1	0.23	0
Glastonbury	3	0.69	0

Department	Number of Reports Submitted by 3/18/26	Percent of Total Reports	Number of Reports Submitted after 3/18/26
Granby	0	0	0
Greenwich	1	0.23	0
Groton City	0	0	0
Groton Long Point	1	0.23	0
Groton Town	2	0.46	0
Guilford	1	0.23	2
Hamden	0	0	0
Hartford	2	0.46	0
Ledyard	4	0.92	0
Madison	1	0.23	0
Manchester	10	2.30	0
Meriden	0	0	0
Middlebury	0	0	0
Middletown	1	0.23	0
Milford	3	0.69	0
Monroe	1	0.23	0
Montville	2	0.46	0
Naugatuck	22	5.06	0
New Britain	1	0.23	0
New Canaan	1	0.23	0
New Haven	7	1.61	1
New London	9	2.07	0
New Milford	7	1.61	0
Newington	0	0	0
Newtown	3	0.69	0
North Branford	4	0.92	0
North Haven	2	0.46	0
Norwalk	3	0.69	0
Norwich	0	0	0
Old Saybrook	5	1.15	0
Orange	0	0	0
Plainfield	3	0.69	0
Plainville	0	0	0
Plymouth	0	0	0
Portland	0	0	0
Putnam	2	0.46	0

Department	Number of Reports Submitted by 3/18/26	Percent of Total Reports	Number of Reports Submitted after 3/18/26
Redding	0	0	0
Ridgefield	0	0	0
Rocky Hill	2	0.46	0
Seymour	1	0.23	0
Shelton	6	1.38	0
Simsbury	1	0.23	0
South Windsor	0	0	4
Southbury	1	0.23	0
Southington	4	0.92	0
Stamford	4	0.92	0
Stonington	0	0	0
Stratford	3	0.69	0
Suffield	6	1.38	0
Thomaston	0	0	0
Torrington	1	0.23	0
Trumbull	11	2.53	0
University of Connecticut	2	0.46	0
Vernon	8	1.84	0
Wallingford	1	0.23	0
Waterbury	9	2.07	0
Waterford	2	0.46	0
Watertown	2	0.46	0
West Hartford	0	0	2
West Haven	0	0	0
Weston	0	0	0
Westport	1	0.23	0
Wethersfield	1	0.23	0
Willimantic	6	1.38	0
Wilton	6	1.38	0
Winchester	0	0	0
Windsor	1	0.23	0
Windsor Locks	0	0	0
Wolcott	3	0.69	0
Woodbridge	0	0	0